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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A.

The District Court Erred in Denying Mr. Tinoco's lVIotion to Dismiss Because the
Delay in Bringing Him to Trial Violated His Speedy Trial Rights
Mr. Tinoco's trial was delayed outside the speedy trial period because of the district

court's error. Because the reason for the delay cannot constitute "good cause," the case should
have been dismissed without resorting to analysis of the factors established by Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514 (1972). Even when those factors are considered, the circumstances demonstrate
that Mr. Tinoco's rights to speedy trial as protected by LC.§ 19-3501(3) and the state and
federal constitutions were violated and that the case should have been dismissed.
The state urges that Mr. Tinoco's claim is "without merit" because his first trial, which
ended in mistrial due to the district court's error, occurred within six months. See Respondent's
Brief, p. 5. Without citation to authority beyond the language ofl.C. § 19-3501, the state
contends that "the statute does not require a trial must go [sic] to verdict with six months of
arraignment." Id. Initially, the statutory phrase "brought to trial" must be construed within the
context of the right the statute was enacted to protect and, thus, cannot refer to a trial that ends
prior to the presentation of evidence. Further, Mr. Tinoco's motion to dismiss was filed pursuant
to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho
Constitution in addition to LC.§ 19-3501. Even if the period prior to the mistrial is not
considered under the statutory analysis, it should be under the constitutional analysis.
1.

Section 19-3501 governs the period before and following a mistrial

The "court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the ... indictment to
be dismissed ... if a defendant, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, is not

brought to trial within [six months] from the date that the defendant was arraigned." LC. §
19-3501(3). The clear and plain language of the statute does not refer to any period following a
remittitur from an appeal after a trial has once been held. State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 704, 706,
931 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Scroggie, 114 Idaho 188, 190, 755 P.2d 485,487
(Ct. App. 1988). However, a mistrial fails to bring about any resolution to a case whereas a
retrial following an appeal occurs after a defendant has been brought to a trial that resulted in a
verdict. In State v. Talmage, 104 Idaho 249,658 P.2d 920 (1983), the defendant explicitly
complained about the delay between a first trial, which resulted in mistrial, and a second trial.
The defendant did not argue and the Court did not address whether the period prior to the first
trial could be properly considered in the speedy trial analysis. Thus, it does not appear that Idaho
has addressed the significance of the phrase "brought to trial" in the context of a mistrial.
Further, the phrase "brought to trial" can be reasonably limited to refer to a trial that
adjudicates the charges faced by the accused or, as contended by the state, the mere
commencement of trial. When a statute's language is capable of more than one reasonable
construction, it is ambiguous and a must be construed with legislative intent in mind, which is
ascertained by examining the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the policy behind
the statute, and its legislative history in addition to the literal words of the statute. BHC

Intermountain Hosp., Inc. v. Ada County, 150 Idaho 93, 95,244 P.3d 237,239 (2010); State v.
Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471,475, 163P.3d1183, 1187 (2007).
The right to a speedy trial is designed: (I) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2)
to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) to limit the possibility that the defense
will be impaired. State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 118, 29 P.3d 949, 954 (2001). Mr. Tinoco
2

remained in custody throughout the proceedings and it is hard to perceive how the mistrial due to
the Batson issue helped minimize his anxiety. At least where a mistrial is declared after a
deadlocked jury, the defense can be said to have derived some benefit from the opportunity to
test the state's case. Here, no evidence was presented and the mistrial's occurrence addressed
none of the concerns the legislature meant to address in enacting LC.§ 19-3501(3).
Further, a delay caused by a mistrial could be attributable to the defense, prosecution or,
as here, the district court. Whether a mistrial warrants dismissal on speedy trial grounds is best
assessed by application of the Barker v. Wingo factors and assessing whether the mistrial
constituted good cause. Accordingly, the phrase "brought to trial" within the meaning of LC. §
19-3501 contemplates a trial that results in a verdict.
2.

The time period between a mistrial and retrial applies in the constitutional
speedy trial analysis

"In the absence of a statute explicitly setting the time frame within which a retrial must
occur following an appeal, the speedy trial inquiry should be approached with the constitutional
analysis, applying the Barker balancing test." Scroggie, 114 Idaho at 190, 755 P.2d at 487.
Although some states have adopted the position that the speedy trial "clock" starts anew
following a mistrial, other jurisdictions hold that the speedy trial analysis applies to the time
period between a mistrial and retrial. Goncalves v. Com., _S.W.3d

_ , Supreme Court

of Kentucky Docket No. 2010-SC-000142-MR (February 21, 2013) (2013 WL 646171). The
"latter approach is appropriate because the four-factor Barker analysis allow for full and proper
consideration of intervening mistrials under the second factor, the reasons for delay." Id.; see
also United States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 272 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting "at least three valid bases"
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for delay including mistrial in addition to complicated prosecution and defense pre-trial
proceedings); Clayton v. State, 822 So.2d 1141, 1145 (Miss. App. 2002) (when a trial results in a
mistrial, the time ofretrial remains within the discretion of the trial court, although a substantial
delay may still violate the constitutional right to a speedy trial); State v. O'Neal, 203 P.3d 135,
142 (N.M. App. 2008) (considering mistrial among various reasons for delay); State v. Manley,
220 S.W.3d 116, 124 (Tex. App. 2007) (same).
Even if the statutory obligation to bring a defendant to trial within six months is satisfied
by a trial that ends in mistrial, a mistrial does not satisfy the constitutional guarantee of a speedy
trial. Rather, the delay caused by a mistrial must be evaluated in the context of the Barker factors
including the reason for the delay occasioned by the mistrial. As discussed in greater detail in
Mr. Tinoco' s Opening Brief, his trial was delayed because the district court misled counsel as to
when the Batson challenge could be heard, which ultimately required the district court to declare
a mistrial. As found by the district court, Mr. Tinoco "stood on his speedy trial rights"
throughout the proceedings" [Tr. Vol. 5, p. 33, ln. 18-21] and was continually incarcerated. The
reason for the delay, weighed against the other Barker factors, establishes that Mr. Tinoco's
constitutional speedy trial rights were violated. Accordingly, this Court should reverse Mr.
Tinoco' s judgment of conviction and sentences and remand this case with instruction to grant the
motion to dismiss.

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in Mr. Tinoco's Opening Brief, he respectfully asks
that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and sentences and remand for further
proceedings.

4

Respectfully submitted this

__j_ day of July, 2013.

~f{fe

Attorney for Jorge Tinoco
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
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Nicole Schafer
Office of the Attorney General
Criminal Division
P.O. Box 83720
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Robyn Fyffe
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